An Essay on an Open
Window
Valter Pomar*
The present essay addresses
four main issues: the situation of the Latin American left as a whole in 1991;
what has happened with that left ever since; what its current situation is; what
its prospects are.
The context chosen
is 1991 due to the disappearance of the Soviet Union, which we will discuss
below.
However, before
doing so, it need be reminded that the downfall of the Soviet Union itself brought
an attempt initiated in 1917 to an end; this attempt originally consisted in
seizing power in a country where capitalist development was but in its early
stages and embarking on the socialist transition, in the hope that this would
give rise to revolutions in those countries where capitalism was further
developed. These revolutions would, in turn, advance the socialist transition
in Russia itself.
But it so happened
that in the decades following October 1917 no revolution succeeded in
capitalist developed countries.
Quite the opposite,
a shift to the Right took place, especially in Germany. Against all
expectations, the socialist movement in advanced countries was unable to aid
the socialist movement in less developed countries.
Indeed, were we to make
an overall balance of World War II and its consequences, it would not be far
from the truth to claim that the implications tracing back to the very
existence of the Soviet Union saved the bourgeois parliamentary democracy,
helped establish the so-called welfare state, encouraged the creation of an
international cartel under the United States' leadership and, all in all, helped
capitalism live “golden years” of expansion which eventually resulted in the advent
of a new capitalist stage: the one we live nowadays.
According to the
Soviet Union, the “socialist camp” born after World War II did not fulfill the
role expected out of revolutions in developed countries in favor of the
revolutionary Russia of 1917. China and the popular democracies in Eastern
Europe (Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania, German
Democratic Republic and Bulgaria) were, basically, also countries in early
stages of capitalist development.
Therefore, when considered
in all its extent, the effort of the so-called socialist camp triggered the
generalisation of a pattern of industrial development already being superseded
in capitalist countries, all in the context of a political system questioned –both
internally and externally– by sectors of the working classes themselves.
Similarly –had it
all gone along the expected track– the idea that in the long run the so-called
socialist camp would be able to compete with and defeat the capitalist camp was
not all that far-fetched; but today it is evident that it would only have been feasible
if capitalism itself had not undergone a qualitative transformation. That is,
if capitalism had kept to the paradigms existing in 1917 it could have been eclipsed
by the socialism brought into existence by that year's revolution.
Still, the “capitalist
camp” ensuing from World War II was a tough opponent, among other reasons,
because an intense development of capitalist forces of production was brought
forth by the inter-empire alliance against the USSR and by the macroeconomic
consequences of the welfare state, combined with the ongoing imperialism. That
is to say that the emergence and existence of a socialist camp prompted
capitalism to be altered in a way that enabled it –in the medium run– to defeat
that very socialist camp.
The Soviet Union
and her allies neither achieved nor surpassed the levels of development
experienced by advanced capitalist countries, except in specific compartmentalised
segments and/or segments with high social cost, such as the armaments industry.
Within this
context, the role of the crisis in the 1970s diverged from that of the crisis
in the 1930s.
In the thirties, classic,
imperialistic capitalism endured a “crisis of maturity” coupled with a dispute for
hegemony, dating from the late 19th century and which had already led to World
War I, between capitalist countries.
World
War II, the enlargement of the socialist camp, the dawn of the welfare state,
decolonization, and the spread of democracy (bourgeois and popular) are traceable to
that crisis in the 1930s.
The crisis in the
1970s was already one of the milestones in the transition between two stages of
capitalism: from the stage of classic, imperialistic capitalism (1895–1945)
into the neoliberal, imperialistic capitalism we live in today.
The crisis of the
1970s was, above all, a reaction of capitalism against the conditions of a
period (1945–1970) when the power of Labour and the power of Capital were
relatively balanced. This reaction could have been frustrated, or even
prevented from happening at all, had the socialdemocratic and communist
currents acted otherwise either during the post-WWII period or during the
crisis in the 1970s or even in subsequent years.
The fact is that
socialdemocracy in Western Europe and Soviet-type communism –as well as Latin
American national developmentalism and African and Asian nationalisms– were
forged in the heat of battle against, and partial victories over, classic
imperialistic capitalism.
Partly successful
though they were in the struggle against capitalism and old-school imperialism,
the aforementioned movements were unable to attain the same degree of success
when confronted with the type of capitalism that arose in the wake of the
crisis in the seventies.
More precisely, a
variant, Chinese communism, opted for a strategic change (such change can be
portrayed as a strategic withdrawal, like taking a step back so as to leap
forward) and today –after thirty years– China displays results that are
impressive when its economic power is assessed; but it sustains distinct
political and geopolitical complications.
Hence, the demise
of the USSR and of Eastern European popular democracies is attributable to one
of the battles embedded in a larger process, namely, to the transition between
two stages of capitalism: from classic imperialistic to neoliberal imperialistic.
It is apparent that
it was a battle of paramount strategic significance, although some of its
implications are only now coming to light. Actually, part of the phenomena that
took place after 1991 was already under way in the eighties and was expedited –although
not created per se– by the fall of
the USSR.
If we survey the
worldwide correlation of powers from the viewpoint of social classes, the
periods immediately preceding and following 1991 can be deemed as a defeat of
the working classes.
This defeat can be
objectively appraised in terms of working hours per day, relative value of
wages, working conditions, public service provision and real democracy.
From
the standpoint of ideas, in the period last above mentioned we lived at the
peak of individualism to the detriment of public, social and collective ideals,
in parallel with the offensive launched by pro-capitalist ideas and the retreat
–often a rout– of anti-capitalist ideas.
In the field of politics,
right-wing parties strengthened and several
left-wing parties shifted to center-right positions. As for the military, the
global balance tilted towards NATO and, particularly, the United States.
The situation did
change somewhat –if considered comprehensively– after twenty years, but not greatly.
Neoliberal capitalism went into a period of crisis, inter-capitalist conflicts
heightened, some neoliberal tenets are longer no attributed their past
credibility. Furthermore, in some regions of the world, anti-capitalist ideas
recovered lost ground.
Nonetheless, when
it comes to examining objective living conditions of the working classes all
over the world, we find that inequalities today are greater than they were in
the 1970s, the 1980s or in 1991.
We also find a
different working class.
First, it has been
growing: there are more proletarians now in the world than there were in 1970,
1980 or 1991. Secondly, the working class today is more widely interconnected,
whether due to objective links between production processes, or due to
consumption of goods produced in distant places. Thirdly –paradoxical as it may
be–, the working class is subjectively more fragmented either because of
material living conditions (let us compare, for example, the cleaning staff
working in malls and the people who shop there), or because of changes in work
places. Advanced as communications technology is, this fragmentation can be perceived
even after the advent of Internet (truth be told, the democratic and
integrative potential Internet offers is thwarted by its disintegrating and
anti-democratic potential).
In other words: the
offensive launched by capitalism after the crisis in the 1970s against the
working class lost some of its momentum. In some places, part of the lost
ground was regained by the proletariat. But the setting still remains much of a
wasteland.
In the field of
ideologies, this translates into tremendous confusion and theoretical deficit.
Let it be said
that, from an ideological and theoretical stance, the current anti-capitalist
movement differs greatly from the one in progress between the 1970s and 1991.
During that period,
despite the existence of many a “dissident group”, anti-capitalism was still
under the hegemony of a distinct current: Soviet-type Marxism.
The cornerstone of
this type of Marxism was the belief that it was possible to build socialism
taking an underdeveloped capitalism as a starting point. Based on that belief,
a set of other theses was developed dealing with the process of the
construction of socialism; one stood out: “democracy under the party's control”.
It stood to reason:
if objective conditions do not promote the construction of socialism, it needs
to be compensated with massive doses of “subjective conditions”; that may
eventually mean imposing upon the majority (of society) the point of view of
the minority (not the point of view of the working class but the point of view
of a minority within the working class itself).
The dissolution of
the USSR dismantled Soviet-type Marxism.
It does not mean
that everything done on its behalf was a mistake, or that is lacked historical
value, that it should not be vindicated, or that it was not the actually
existing alternative (what could be termed “the lesser evil”) in certain
circumstances.
When we talk about
the dismantling of Soviet-type Marxism, we mean the failure of one of its key
ideas: that it was possible to build socialism taking an underdeveloped
capitalism as a starting point. This idea took on several shapes, like
“Socialism in One Country” which led to some confusion –persisting today– between
what socialist transition is and what communism is.
This confusion is
grounded, among other things, on the following fact: during the Soviet
experience, for assorted reasons, the attempt was made
–with varying degrees of intensity and success– to eliminate private ownership
and capitalist markets from the socialist transition; in fact, that could only have
occurred at a step further down the process of transition to communism.
In practice, it was
an endeavour to socialize the relationships between production processes in a
context of underdeveloped productive forces by adhering to communist forms at a
time when there was not enough economic content.
The ideology born
from this endeavour merged Marxism, interests representing the most favoured
social ranks within each of the countries of the so-called social camp, and the
realpolitik of the socialist states.
It was for these
and other reasons that Soviet-type Marxism was a school of theory that hampered
–rather than helped– the development of the Marxist analysis of reality and the
strategy to be implemented, both in developed capitalist countries and countries
with underdeveloped capitalism.
However, the
dismantling of Soviet-type Marxism –including the dismantling of its
newspapers, publishing houses and schools– far from being an aid, unequivocally
damaged the body of Marxist, non-Marxist socialist, and non-socialist anti-capitalist
traditions.
Among other reasons,
because it contributed to shatter the belief –which until then was shared by
hundreds of millions of people– that the world was on the road to Socialism,
that Capitalism represents a historical period that will eventually come to an
end, that the main goal of the working classes lies in the struggle for a new
society, and other similar ideas.
This belief rested –and
still does– on very solid scientific grounds; but modern science points to what
the possible trends of historical development are. It is through political
struggle that these trends are to materialize. And the intensity of this
political struggle was contingent on how motivated hundreds of millions of
militants were. For decades, these militants failed to distinguish the struggle
for socialism from the movement in the USSR. And faced with the end of the
latter, they concluded that the former had ended, too.
The dismantling of
Soviet-type Marxism did not culminate in, neither was it followed by, the
strengthening of dissenting currents also inspired by Marxism.
The best known of
these currents, Trotskyism, arose out of the criticism made against Socialism
in One Country; inevitably, it ended up focusing its critique on the political
dimensions of the phenomenon (the so-called Stalinism, bureaucracy, the crisis
of direction, etc.).
This development of
Trotskyan criticism was partly a logical outcome: Soviet-type socialism
withstood and consolidated its hegemony within the Left for decades on end,
thus outwardly disproving the historical frailty of that which was, indeed, its
chief problem, the objective limits to the attempt to build socialism taking an
underdeveloped capitalism as a starting point.
This led the actually
existing Trotskyism not to pay duly attention to structural weaknesses of real
socialism, pinning instead all hopes on the possibility of success of a
“political revolution” that would adjust the course of the “true revolution hijacked
by the Stalinist bureaucracy”.
By doing so, the
very fundamentals of their critique against “Socialism in One Country” were
contradicted. For if all that was needed was a political revolution, the
emphasis was placed on subjectivity, not on objective limits. As it is
generally known, actually existing political revolutions ultimately paved the
way to capitalism in its full range.
That is, when
subjectivity came on stage it reasserted the objective limits: rather than a
leap to heaven, it was a plunge into hell.
Although somewhat
of a Trotskyian bias has become hegemonic among those who critique Soviet-type
Marxism, the Trotskyian tradition has not established itself as the theoretical
core that could serve today as the source either to critique 20th century
Socialism, or to discuss the socialist strategy in the 21st century; a
different approach would be –and will be– needed to appropriately address
first, the relationship between capitalist development and socialist transition
and secondly, the consequences derived from this in the struggle for power,
even within the framework of capitalism.
Eurocommunism
failed as an alternative as well. Leaving aside all political mistakes that may
have been made by parties along the lines of eurocommunism, the attempt to
peacefully segue from the European “organized capitalism” –operative in the 1950s
and 1960s– to a “renewed socialism” was faced with a dilemma stemming from its
very origin: those societies displayed a fickle balance between the socialist
and capitalist “camps”, between the bourgeoisie and the workers of each country
and, finally, between the level of wealth produced in each country and the wealth
obtained from the periphery.
The endeavour to
shift from the welfare state to the socialist transition upset that fickle
balance, thus destabilising democratic freedoms, which were the premise on
which a peaceful transition was predicated. Let us recall Operation Gladio.
Neither did the
dismantling of Soviet-type Marxism cause the theoretical strengthening of those
socialdemocratic currents issued from a common core in 1875.
After 1914, socialdemocracy
strained to survive, as was evident in its two bastions: Germany and Austria.
Its success following World War II was, to some extent, collateral to the
existence of the USSR. The welfare state and “organised capitalism” could have
hardly existed without it. Later events support this interpretation; the disappearance
of the USSR destroyed the economic, social and political bases of that socialdemocracy.
Socialdemocracy and
organised capitalism lived through their golden ages simultaneously. One and
the other relied largely on the existence of the USSR. Once the latter had
fallen, the former fell down, too, although more slowly than Soviet communism.
What about the
Chinese? They seem to have learnt from the Soviet experience and preferred
instead to resort to a strategic retreat by making significant allowances to
capitalism. Partly due to these concessions (sometimes argued not to be concessions
but conversions) Chinese Marxism is less appealing worldwide than what Soviet-type
Marxism was in its heyday in all its variants, including the Maoist one.
Recapitulating, the
dismantling of Soviet-type Marxism was not followed by the arrival of a
different hegemonic tradition born at the very heart of the world's Left.
It was replaced not
by plurality but by a vast confusion; enthusiasts of historical analogies are
reminded of the socialist movement after the defeat of the revolutions in 1848.
It is worth
remembering that it was exactly in the period between 1848 and 1895 –due to the
combination of objective processes of capitalist development and ideological
struggle both inside and outside the socialist movement– that the fundamental
core of Marxist ideas was devised.
Paradoxically,
while we witness this ideological confusion within the socialist movement, worldwide
events taking place since the crisis in the seventies, and particularly after 1991,
prove Marxism's founding principles correct, especially the idea that the
increase in human productivity
–promoted by capitalism– creates, at the same time, the material bases and the
need for a different kind of society, organized around the collective
appropriation of what is yielded by collective work.
It goes without
saying that this different kind of society –we will keep calling it communist
to tell it apart from the socialist transition aimed at communism– will not be,
after all, a spontaneous byproduct of the capitalist society.
The “spontaneous”
trend of capitalism involves inducing exploitation, uprising, and crisis, along
with wars. As long as the working class, the class producing wealth through
their labour, does not organise itself so as to transcend capitalism, this will
continue to exist for quite some time, until it reaches its own limits
destroying everything and everyone.
Overcoming capitalism
as a means of production requires and depends upon a level of material
development that would render exploitation completely anachronistic. In other
words, it requires an increase in social productivity that would progressively
“depreciate” the products of labour (that is, that would reduce to almost zero
the working hours that are socially necessary) thus making it possible to pair
maximum abundance and minimum labour.
When it comes to overcoming
capitalism as a specific historical phenomenon, it all depends on the political
struggle, that is to say, it depends on whether workers, the class that
produces wealth, will rise as the hegemonic class and reorganise society. This
entails a political process (revolution) and a political, socio-economic
transition (socialism) to subsequently construct a different means of
production (communism).
It is clear that
the struggle to attain these aims calls for a marriage of awareness and
organization, tactics and strategy, reform and revolution.
It is about
fighting to surmount exploitation and oppression, traits of capitalism. As such,
it is a struggle contemporary with capitalism.
On the other hand,
it is about fighting to prevail over the society of classes, or to put it
differently, to transcend a whole period of our history when one part of
society exploits the labour of another. In this sense, this struggle mirrors
the struggles waged by the classes exploited by means of production pre-existing
capitalism. And it is also identified with struggles waged within capitalism
against mechanisms of oppression and exploitation that are not purely economic,
such as racism, machismo and
homophobia.
The utmost effort
must be made for these struggles to be mutually reinforcing; but it is worth
remembering that although these are connected, interdependent struggles, they
are not one and the same. Struggles against racism, homophobia, machismo, generational conflicts and
others have their own sources and call for their own battles and specific
solutions.
All the above
discussion rarely finds sound political translation in Oceania, Africa, Europe
and the United States. In Latin America we are already witnessing several solid
attempts to approach these subjects and embark upon a new socialist cycle, a
debate and practical action which –as recently stated by historian Eric
Hobsbawm– is largely attained by resorting to Marxist grammar.
This refers us back
to the issues raised at the outset of this essay: the situation of the Latin American
left as a whole in 1991; what has happened with that left ever since; what its
current situation is; what its prospects are.
The Latin American
left was globally defeated between the sixties and early seventies. The Cuban
Revolution was blocked off; other popular, nationalist and revolutionary
processes were defeated; Latin American guerrillas
were unsuccessful; the experience of Unidad
Popular ended tragically; and a significant portion of the continent was subjugated
by dictatorships, both de jure and de facto.
Between the late
seventies and early eighties there was a turning point, illustrated by the
considerable social struggles in Brazil and the victory of the Sandinista guerrilla.
During the 1980s,
dictatorships yield. They were replaced by restricted democracies increasingly
influenced by neoliberalism.
Collor's triumph in
Brazil (1989) and Chamorro's in Nicaragua (1990), among others, signalled the
beginning of a decade of neoliberal hegemony.
It was in this
context that in 1990, immediately before the dissolution of the USSR, a
substantial part of the Latin American left decided to meet at a seminar that
was conducive to the Sao Paulo Forum.
With the
dissolution of the USSR a direct, material impact was felt in Cuba. On the rest
of the countries, especially on their left wings, the impact was mainly
ideological and political. But the disheartening effects that the crisis of socialism
had on large segments of the Left in other regions of the world were lessened
by the threatening proximity of the United States, the recent struggle against
dictatorships and the battering against the rising neoliberalism, all seemingly
acting as a “vaccine”.
This does not mean
that there were no defections, betrayals and ideological conversions. But when
considered globally and comparatively, the Latin American left stood its ground
much better than its European peer.
At least four facts
account for this.
First: owing to our
region's “place” in the labour division that was in effect during the classic
imperialistic period, there was no socialdemocratic experience in our continent
analogous to the welfare state that would materialise the belief that it was
possible to reconcile capitalism, democracy and social welfare.
The
movement that got the closest to that state of affairs (populism, especially in
Argentina) was brutally and violently countered by oligarchies and by
imperialism. Even where the Left fought under democratic, capitalist emblems,
the actually existing bourgeoisie was generally a
fierce opponent, so to speak.
This did not destroy
illusions altogether, though. Yet the struggles in the eighties took on a much
more radical bias that contributed to some of the
–otherwise unattainable– successes of those who opposed neoliberalism.
Second: despite the
mistakes and the limitations and, mainly, in spite of the setback caused by the
combination of the American blockade and the collapse of the USSR, the brave
Cuban Resistance avoided our having to look -in our own continent- on the depressing
and disheartening scenario witnessed in several locations in Eastern Europe and
in the USSR itself. Furthermore, certain characteristics of the Cuban society were,
and still are, a positive differential for the impoverished worker in the vast
majority of Latin American countries; this was generally not the case in
Europe. Hence, it was easier for large segments of the Latin American left to
continue to advocate socialism, to perceive national specificities, and to
uphold a more critical attitude towards supposedly universal models, especially
foreign ones.
Third: Neoliberal
hegemony, associated with the American predominance after the disappearance of
the USSR, was immediately regarded as –and genuinely was– a hazard, not only to
the lefts but also to Latin American national sovereignties and economic
development. This allowed many regional left-wing organizations to compensate
with nationalism and developmentalism what was otherwise lost or diluted in
terms of socialist and revolutionary pragmatic content.
Fourth: the end of
the USSR opened up a new horizon for expansion to capitalist powers, especially
the United States and the newly-born European Union. A joining of forces in
Eastern Europe and in the Middle East followed, along with a “systemic lack of
concern” for the going-ons in the so-called Latin American backyard.
This does not
account for the fact that the parties that were critical towards neoliberalism
came to power from 1998 onwards in the region's prominent countries; but it
does account for how swiftly they did.
Paradoxically, it
was because of those victories that certain consequences stemming from both the
end of the USSR and from the surfacing of neoliberal capitalism came to light. The
Latin American left faced these implications at the exact time when it was
starting to take office.
Let us start by the
ideological implications. The lefts that came into power from 1998 on –but also
those that established themselves as opposition, in some cases against the
Right, in other cases even against progressive governments and Centre-Left– were
not able to overcome the ideological confusion, nor were they able to solve the
theoretical deficit that is evidenced in three fundamental fields: balancing
the attempts to construct 20th century socialism; the evaluation of 21st
century capitalism; the drawing up of a strategy fit for the new historical
period.
The attempts to
devise a theory of “21st century socialism” are still kaleidoscopical; the evaluation
of neoliberal, imperialistic capitalism is but tentative; and the practical
results exhibit the limits to the different strategies. The confusion is
deepened by the influence of certain very active “schools” in the Left, such as
developmentalism, stagism or movementism, not to mention a certain worship of
martyrdom (“just a few, but good fellows”, “the worse, the better” and other
sayings of the sort) clearly attributable to our region's deep-seated Christian
roots.
Of course, the
ideological confusion and the theoretical limitation do not pose such a serious
problem when all is smooth sailing. In a sense, the opposite happens. A dose of
ignorance about the material limits helps
–since the “impossible” remains unknown– push the boundaries of what is
possible.
But when there is
headwind, theoretical clearness and ideological consistency become fundamental
assets. And now, by mid-2012, we find ourselves at a moment of contradictory
winds, as evidenced by the coup d'etat
in Paraguay last June.
Let us consider now
the political implications. The chief one resides in the fact that –except for
a few rare exceptions– the body of Latin American lefts have incorporated to
their strategic arsenal electoral competition, parliamentary action and
government management.
That is
to say, they have incorporated weapons typical of the socialdemocratic arsenal
at the exact same time that in the Old Continent the progressive aspects of
both the bourgeois electoral democracy
and classic socialdemocracy are waning.
Several
reasons opened the path for the Left to annex electoral competition,
parliamentary action and government management as key weapons. The reasons to
be ascribed to the lefts are military-political defeat of the guerrillas, a decline in prejudices
(whether justified or not) against the “bourgeois democracy”, and the distinct dynamics that allowed for
a more or less successful combination of social struggle and electoral struggle
in each country.
However, so that
those weapons could be fairly successfully used by the lefts since the late
nineties until today, it is necessary to consider the relative change in
attitude by the United States, by the rights and the local bourgeoisies, which
in several countries had no means and/or motives to impose an electoral ban on
the lefts.
With the initial
elation gone, the different Latin American lefts ran into the limits resulting
from what we may term electoral path. In all sorts of fashions –because the lefts,
the processes and the political cultures are different– it was possible to
discriminate state from government; the trying combination of representative
democracy and direct democracy; the limits to popular participation and social
movements; the differences between revolutionary lawfulness and institutional
lawfulness.
Moreover, the
defense mechanisms of the bourgeois state –such as bureaucracy, justice,
corruption and armed forces– are still efficiently operative in order to
constrain progressive and left-wing governments.
Be as it may, more
than ever before, it is clear today that the Latin American left needs a deeper
insight into the regional and worldwide experiences that have resorted to electoral,
parliamentary and governmental weapons as a means to attempt the socialist or
socialdemocratic transformation of society.
The lack of clarity
on that matter, or better yet, the different interpretations on the matter,
have led since 1998 to bitter controversies within the Latin American left,
between two extremes and its intermediate variants: those who wish to advance
at a faster pace and those who fear to advance at pace faster than the
correlation of strengths would allow.
The two previous
matters go hand in hand with a third one, rather more complex, that involves
grasping the historical period we live in and the conflicts at stake in Latin
America.
As previously
stated, the end of the USSR should be regarded within the context of transition
between classic, imperialistic capitalism and neoliberal capitalism, which is
also imperialistic but different from the former one.
Classic,
imperialistic capitalism went through two stages: one branded by the inter-imperialistic
ambition and another marked by the dispute between the “socialist camp” and the
“imperialistic camp”. During these two moments the contradictions internal to
each country and those contradictions between metropolis and periphery
coexisted –along with the contradictions mentioned above.
With the fall of
the USSR, the dispute between “camps” disappeared, too. The inter-capitalist
contradiction was heightened and a new variant stemmed from it: the dispute
between the old, traditional centers (United States, European Union and Japan)
and the new, emergent centers (like China and her allies, the so-called BRICS).
The dispute between
these centers (old and new) and their corresponding peripheries acquires
different shapes, just as the internal disputes within each country are
different. It should be noted that they are, essentially, inter-capitalist disputes:
socialism still remains in a period of strategic defense.
In the case of
Latin America, for example, the Left has been increasing its participation in
governments and confronting neoliberalism –with more or less determination– for
over ten years; but capitalism continues to be hegemonic everywhere.
This does not
prevent some segments of the Left from labeling the political process under way
in their respective countries with combative names (different variants of
“revolution”), nor does it prevent other segments of the Left from “solving”
the objective difficulties accusing the parties in office of lacking fighting
spirit and purposefulness –which is often undoubtedly true. But beyond the
betrayals, the voluntarism and aspirations, the truth seems to be as follows:
even where the ruling left remains faithful to the socialist and communist
purposes, the material conditions of the times we live in impose objective
limits.
In essence, those
limits constrain left-wing governments, even those politically more radical, to
resort to capitalist methods so as to promote economic development, increase systemic
productivity of economies, extend their control over national wealth, lessen
external dependence and the power of transnational capital, particularly the
financial one. Furthermore, these limits constrain the funding of social
policies.
It is worth
remembering that neoliberal, imperialistic capitalism was the cause of a
backward step in Latin American economic development. One of the political
consequences of that retrogression was the gradual dislocation, favorable to
the left-wing opposition, of segments of the bourgeoisie and the middle ranks. This
dislocation brought forth a victory at the ballot box for the current progressive
and left-wing governments and engendered pluriclass-based governments
genetically related to the defense of plural economies, with a wide
predominance of private ownership in all its full range, including the most
contradictory ones such as cooperative ownership and state capitalism.
It should be noted
that this situation does not conflict with one of the conclusions to be drawn
from the socialist experiences in the 20th century: the socialization of
production relationships is dependent upon the socialization of production forces.
And this, in turn, demands capitalist methods with a degree of intensity proportionally
inverse to the previous level of economic development.
At this point, all
previously said can be summarized as follows. By 1991, the Latin American left
had undergone a twofold process of defeat: first, the defeat of the guerrilla stage in the sixties and
seventies; later, the defeat of the redemocratization stage in the eighties. Early
on, the end of the USSR and the rise of neoliberalism highlighted the defeat although,
eventually, a third stage with a different end result ensues: 1998 signals the
beginning of a cycle of election victories that created a favorable correlation
of forces in the region, that remains today.
In a first
instance, internal and external conditions that made this cycle of victories
possible allowed these governments to expand national sovereignty, political
democracy, social welfare, and economic development for both their countries
and their peoples. But basically, this was achieved by redistributing income
differently, without altering the frameworks for either production or wealth
distribution.
In a second
instance, the limits exerted by the very framework of production and wealth distribution,
stressed by other variables –political, ideological, strategic, economic,
sociological, geopolitical– keep the levels of national sovereignty, political
democracy, social welfare and economic development within boundaries much
narrower than initially expected by the Left, whether in office or in
opposition.
We are now in that
second instance, which co-occurs with an international downturn that impacts on
the region in two profound ways: on the one hand, it thoroughly complicates the
situation of those economies dependent on international markets; on the other
hand, it increases the pressure the metropolis wield on the region, thus
putting an end to that period of a certain “strategic lack of concern” that led
to some election victories.
Internal
limitations and external change of scenery tend to further aggravate the
conflict within each country, not only within lefts and rights, but also
between social and political forces that comprise what we call the Left(s); they
may also exacerbate some differences between regional governments.
Having said so:
what are the prospects?
First, we should
consider how macro variables we have no direct influence on can impact on the
region: the pace and magnitude of the international crisis, the conflicts
between the great powers, extent and repercussions of wars. Among macro
variables, we foreground those connected with the future of the United States:
Will they regain their global hegemony? Will they focus their energy on their
regional hegemony? Will they deplete their energy in the internal conflict
unfolding in their own country?
Secondly,
the behaviour of the Latin American bourgeoisie is to be considered, especially
that of the transnationalized segments. How do they behave when faced with
progressive and left-wing governments? What is their attitude regarding
regional integration processes? How capable are they to compete against the
metropolitan bourgeoisies and to strive to achieve a more substantial role in
the world scene? The stability of the ballot box and the strength of pluriclass-based
governments hinge on the bourgeoisie's “mood”. Or, to reverse the terms, their “being in no
mood” will radicalize the conditions of the class struggle both in the region
and within each country.
Thirdly, the
capacity and willingness of hegemonic left-wing segments
–political parties, social movements, intelligentsia and governments– should be
listed.
The question that
arises is: How far and how fast are these hegemonic segments willing to go to
push the boundaries of the current period? Will they be able to? To put matters
in a different light, the question is whether they will make the most of this
political landscape, unheard of in the history of the region, in order to
enhance regional integration, national sovereignty, political democratization,
and to promote social welfare and economic development. And above all, whether
they will be able to alter the structural patterns of external dependency and
concentration of ownership prevailing in the region for centuries now.
Taking these three significant
dimensions of the problem into account, we can summarize the prospects:
objective potentialities, subjective difficulties and time scarcity.
Objective
potentialities: bearing negative alternatives in mind, the international
scenario and the current conditions in Latin America, especially in South
America, make two considerable positive alternatives feasible: a stage of capitalist
development with socialdemocratic imprint and/or a new stage of construction of
socialism.
As for this second
alternative, we are –from a material stance– relatively better than Russia in
1917, than China in 1949, than Cuba in 1959 and better than Nicaragua in 1979.
Subjective
difficulties: today, at the very core of Latin American lefts, those who have
the will have no power, and those who do have the power have shown no will to
adopt, neither promptly nor vigorously, the measures required to benefit from
opportunities that not only the international situation but also the regional
correlation of forces are opening up.
A fact not to be
missed: there is neither the time nor the raw material to establish a new
hegemonic left. Should our hegemonic left not seize this window of opportunity,
it will be but a chance gone out the window.
Time is running
out: as the international crisis progresses, there is a trend towards a growing
instability that undermines the conditions for the regional left to act. The opportunity
to fall back on elected governments to implement significant transformations in
Latin American societies will not last forever. The window opened in the late
nineties is not yet closed. But the gathering storm might just do so.
As a final word, I
would like to reassert that the game is far from over; therefore, we should
continue to work for the Latin American lefts
–especially those in office and among them, the Brazilian left– do what they
have to (and can) do. If that happens, we will successfully overcome the
current period of strategic defense in the struggle for socialism. In short,
the window remains open.
*Valter Pomar is a member of the National Committee of the Workers’
Party – PT, from Brazil, and
executive secretary for the Forum of Sao Paulo.
