(texto ainda não revisado)
Prepared for lecturing at the first
class of the international
training course for
trainers
in English.
Introduction
This reading is composed of four chapters. The first is
a summary on Lenin’s biography. The second summarizes the
trajectory of the Russian Revolution. The third presents Lenin’s
complete works. The fourth and last chapter is an analysis of Lenin’s
contribution to the Socialist mindset.
The first chapter was written in 2001, as a subsidy to a
tribute that the PT’s tendency Articulação de Esquerda
(translated as Left’s Articulation) did for Lenin and the Paris
Commune. The other three chapters were recently written.
Short biography
Vladimir Ilitch Ulyanov was born in Simbirsk (its name
was later changed to Ulyanovsk), on April 1870.
His father was a primary schools inspector; He died when
Vladimir was 16. His mother and sisters were constant companions,
including during his exiles inland and abroad.
At the age of 17, Vladimir lost his older brother:
Alexandre Ulyanov was executed in May 1887 for being part of
conspiracy against Czar Alexandre lll ’s life.
In July of the same year, Vladimir concluded his
secondary studies. And, in August, he enrolled in the Law School of
Kazan. He was expelled in December, due to his involvement in the
university student militancy.
Then he spent a few years under a “patrolled freedom,”
which he took as an opportunity to systematically study Marxism. In
this period, he established contacts with representatives from
different revolutionary groups that existed at the time in Russia.
The main socialist tradition in Russia at the time was
“populism,” which preached that it was possible to build
socialism in Russia without going through
capitalism. Populism
took the Russian
peasant community as
its starting point.
Populism has taken many forms, such as the “march to
the people,” when thousands of students, intellectuals, and youth
moved to peasant villages. It also took the form of “terrorism,”
which manifested as attempts to kill the Czar in order to disrupt
Russian absolutism.
Part of the “populist” tradition later became the
Revolutionary-Socialist Party (SR), which had a strong connection
with the peasantry. The left faction within the SR would later
participate in the October 1917 revolution, allied with the
Bolsheviks.
In 1892, Vladimir received his law degree, after passing
his exams as an impartial student.
Lenin’s lawyer “disguise” was useful when Lenin
started attending to political debates, in Saint
Petersburg of 1893 to 1895. He grew closer
to the labor movement, and he began to write his first articles,
where he challenged populism’s ideas and “legal Marxism”.
Legal Marxism adopted some of the viewpoints of Marxism,
but, in fact, it only used such views to glorify capitalism
development.
One representative work of this period is the book ‘What
Are the “Friends of the People” and How They Fight Against the
Social-Democrats.’
On 1895, Vladimir (who, from now on, we’ll call by the
nom de guerre by which he would become known globally: Lenin)
travelled abroad and contacted the Emancipation of Labor Group,
directed by George Plekhanov, the dean on Russian Marxism.
When he returned from abroad, Lenin helped on the
foundation of Fight for the Emancipation of Labor Union.
On December 9, 1895, he was arrested.
He was released on February 1897 and sent to inland
exile (Siberia). He was kept there for three years. During this
period, he married Krupskaya, who would remain his companion till
death.
During his time in prison and in exile, Lenin wrote some
of his most important works, such as “The Tasks of the Russian
Social-Democracy” (1897) and “The Development of Capitalism in
Russia”
It was also while his inland exile that he would reflect
on and deeply criticize the positions of the called ‘economism.’
Economism overvalues the importance of the economic
fight while it underestimates the importance of the political fight,
it also devalues revolutionary theory and the role of left
intellectuals.
In 1900, Lenin returned from inland exile and, in
agreement with other social democrats, dedicated himself to
organizing a journal, through which he connected and organized the
various Social Democratic groups in several Russian cities.
To concretize this project, Lenin traveled abroad where,
in agreement with Plekhanov group, he started a newspaper called
Iskra (“from the spark, the flame will spring”) and a
theoretical journal called Zaria.
Lenin spent the following years abroad, in cities such
as London, Munich, Geneva, Paris and Warsaw.
Iskra’s first edition, dated December 1900, had
an editorial by Lenin, entitled: “Our Movement’s Urgent Tasks.”
Iskra’s ideas became the dominant ones in
Russian Social-Democracy, but they also generated harsh criticism
from Economicists and other groups.
Lenin responded to these critics with a well-known book,
titled ‘What is to be Done?’ which was published in 1902.
The Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic
Labor Party (RSDLP), which was held abroad in 1903, was a great
victory of the group that edited Iskra.
However, in the course of the Congress, the Iskra
editorial group split. They split over a polemic about an
organizational question raised in the first article of the party’s
statute: the definition of party membership.
Lenin argued for a stricter definition: to be a militant
of the party, one had to participate in a party organism.
Sympathizing with the party’s ideas wasn’t enough to be a member.
The delegates who were allied to Lenin lost this
election. Martov (a friend of Lenin’s from his own generation) and
groups that were opposed to Iskra won the election.
But after this vote, some of the delegates who were
allied to Martov on the polemic over membership, left the Congress.
Therefore, when it came time to elect the leadership, Lenin’s group
became the majority of the leading group. After this Congress, these
groups within the RSDLP came to be called the “Bolsheviks”
(which means the majority) and the “Mensheviks”(this
minority). They would later become fractions of the RSDLP and,
eventually, separate and autonomous parties.
Lenin wrote a detailed reflection on the Second Congress
of RSDLP in the book ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back,’ which
was published in 1904.
Later after the Second Congress, the 1904-1905 Russian
Revolution erupted.
Lenin’s reflection on the 1905 revolution clarified
the political divergence between Bolsheviks
and Mensheviks.
Such reflection is stated in the book ‘Two Tactics of
Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution’ (1905).
The 1905 Revolution was defeated, a period of reaction
began across Russia, including in the ideological field.
Lenin’s influence among the Bolsheviks was challenged
by many others militants, among them Bogdanov.
Lenin wrote ‘Materialism and Empiro-criticism,’
published in 1909, to challenge the ideas that Bogdanov was
spreading.
When World
War I started (1914-1918),
many of the socialist
parties across Europe were
overtaken by
nationalism, and
they voted in favor
of the
"war
credits."
Lenin
was part
of the internationalist
minority.
In 1915,
he wrote
“The
Collapse
of the Second
International.” In
1916, he
wrote, “Imperialism,
the Highest Stage of
Capitalism”, which
developed
the thesis that
Russia would be
the "weakest
link" in the
imperialist chain.
In 1917,
shortly after the
February Revolution,
Lenin
surprised
his former comrades
with
the an argument that some
considered contradictory
to what
he argued in
his previous book “Two
Tactics:”
the
slogan
"All
power to the Soviets."
He made this argument known
in works like the well-known “April Thesis.”
In that same revolutionary year, between
the months of August and September, Lenin wrote the book ‘State
and the
Revolution,’
in which he
developed
“the
Marxist doctrine on the state
and the
tasks of the proletariat
in the revolution."
Lenin played a crucial role throughout the years between
1917 and 1924, during the seizure of power, the civil war, on the
organization of the Communist International and the work to frame the
basis of the Soviet State.
One of the works he wrote during this period was
‘Left-wing Communism: An
Infantile Disorder’ (1920).
Lenin
suffered
at least two
assasination attempts.
During the second attempt,
on August
30, 1918, revolutionary
socialist Fanny Kaplan succeeded in
shooting him. Lenin's
health, which was already
relatively weak,
worsened
after the attack.
On
January 21, 1924,
Lenin
died.
The autopsy revealed
a generalized
arteriosclerosis.
Lenin
left a "testament"
in which he made
hard criticisms against
the main
leaders of
the Party. His
critiques included a
direct request
that Stalin
would be replaced
as the General
Secretary
of the Party
by someone
more
respectful towards
the comrades.
The
RCP
Central Committee
decided (in a vote that
split 30 to 10)
that the testament
would
not be read during the
plenary session of the
Twelfth Party
Congress.
The
will was
instead read at
a meeting of
the old Bolsheviks,
and Stalin
offered
his resignation.
The majority
of the attendees
asked
him to continue
in office.
Years later,
Stalin
would perform
lectures
about the
thought of
Lenin
at the University
Sverdlov.
These lectures
were
gathered
in a book
called
Fundamentals of
Leninism.
Also
in the 1920s,
a Brazilian
Communist
named
Otavio
Brandão
used
- apparently
for the first time
– the term
“Marxism-Leninism.”
The Complete works of Lenin
The second chapter is part of study guide, drawn from
analyzing The Complete Works of Lenin.
Lenin
was both a
head of state and a
party leader,
but his main
activity remained
writing.
His
Complete Works -
which does not include
all his texts
- is a
collection of
50
volumes
(on average)
500
pages each,
in
14x21
format. The
Complete Works of
Lenin
are available
in several languages,
including
Russian,
English and
Spanish.
We do not know of any
reissues since the 1990s,
but
the
best-known works
are still
published
in
several languages.
The Complete Works contains:
a) Sketches (sometimes in multiple versions) of other
texts;
b) Letters, not only designated to militants, but also for families and people with whom Lenin had political or professional relationships (such as editors);
c) Journalistic material, for many publications, which Lenin contributed between 1894 and 1924;
d) Complete books;
e) Reviews and short-hand notes of lectures and speeches made by Lenin.
b) Letters, not only designated to militants, but also for families and people with whom Lenin had political or professional relationships (such as editors);
c) Journalistic material, for many publications, which Lenin contributed between 1894 and 1924;
d) Complete books;
e) Reviews and short-hand notes of lectures and speeches made by Lenin.
The main topics discussed by Lenin were:
a) The agrarian matter and its relation to capitalist development in Russia;
b) The role of the Russian working class, its leading role in the evolution of Russia;
d) The role of the party and the revolutionary intelligentsia;
d) The strategy and tactics in the struggle for bourgeois revolution and the socialist revolution in Russia;
e) The seizure of power and the transition to socialism;
f) International relations and the development of capitalism on a world scale;
g) Philosophy, political economy and Marxism.
It is important to say that Lenin's texts are overwhelmingly polemical, that is, he usually develops his arguments in controversy with someone (another intellectual, another theoretical trend, another party, another class).
Knowledge for full understanding the works of Lenin are:
a) the history of Russia and the Russian revolution of 1917;
b) the biography of Lenin;
c) Russian literature;
d) the Marxist literature;
e) the Russian language.
One must also consider the fortune of the works. Part of Lenin’s texts was only published after his death. Part of what has been published during his life had limited circulation, due to his clandestine conditions and the misery that the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party functioned within.
The Complete Works edition was completed after Lenin’s
death. The selection of texts, the editorial notes, supplemental
materials and the translations were contaminated by political
dispute.
The following contents of the Complete Works were
summarized (starting with 32 volumes published by Editorial Carthage
Buenos Aires and 18 published by the political editol La Habana).
General index of the books
Tomo I. 1893-1894. Editorial Cartago. Buenos Aires,
1958. 554 pages.
Tomo II. 1895-1897. Editorial Cartago. Buenos Aires,
1958 554 pages.
Tomo III. Capitalism development in Russia. Editorial
Cartago. Buenos Aires, 1957. 647 pages.
Tomo IV. 1898-1901. Editorial Cartago. Buenos Aires,
1958 457 pages.
Tomo V. May 1901 to February 1902. Editoral Cartago.
Buenos Aires. 1959, 567 pages.
Tomo VI. Janunary 1902 to August 1903. Editoral Cartago.
Buenos Aires. 1959, 555 pages.
Tomo VII. September 1903 to December 1904. Editoral
Cartago. Buenos Aires. 1959, 576 pages.
Tomo VIII. January to July 1905. Editoral Cartago.
Buenos Aires. 1959, 607 pages.
Tomo IX. June to November 1905. Editoral Cartago. Buenos
Aires. 1959, 480 pages.
Tomo X. November 1905 to June 1906. Editoral Cartago.
Buenos Aires. 1960, 551 pages.
Tomo XI. June of 1906 to January 1907. Editoral Cartago.
Buenos Aires. 1960, 516 pages.
Tomo XII. January to June 1907. Editorial Cartago.
Buenos Aires, 1960. 516 pages.
Tomo XIII. Junho de 1907 a abril de 1908. Editoral
Política. Havana, 1963, 538 pages.
Tomo XIV. 1908-1909, Editoral Cartago. Buenos Aires.
1960, 377 pages.
Tomo XV. Março de 1908 a agosto de 1909. Editoral
Cartago. Buenos Aires. 1960, 491 pages.
Tomo XVI. Setembro de 1909 a dezembro de 1910. Editoral
Cartago. Buenos Aires. 1960, 474 pages.
Tomo XVII. Dezembro de 1910 a abril de 1912. Editoral
Cartago. Buenos Aires. 1960, 599 pages.
(Tomo XVII. Dezembro de 1910 a março de 1912 (edição
corregida e aumentada. Editoral Cartago, Buenos Aires, 1970, 559
pages.)
Tomo XVIII. Abril de 1912 a março de 1913. Editoral
Cartago, Buenos Aires, 1960, 636 pages.
Tomo XIX. Março a Dezembro de 1913. Editoral Cartago.
Buenos Aires, 1960, 604 pages.
Tomo XX. Dezembro de 1913 a agosto de 1914. Editoral
Política. Havana, 1963, 597 pages.
Tomo XXI. Agosto de 1914 a dezembro de 1915. Editoral
Política. Havana, 1963, 498 pages.
Tomo XXII. Dezembro de 1915 a Julho de 1916. Editoral
Política. Havana, 1963, 401 pages.
Tomo XXIII. Agosto de 1916 a março de 1917. Editoral
Política. Havana, 1963, 410 pages.
Tomo XXIV. Abril a junho de 1917. Editoral Política.
Havana, 1963, 605 pages.
Tomo XXV. Junho a setembro de 1917. Editoral Política.
Havana, 1963, 522 pages.
Tomo XXVI. Setembro de 1917 a fevereiro de 1918.
Editoral Política. Havana, 1963, 554 pages.
Tomo XXVII. Fevereiro a julho de 1918. Editoral
Política. Havana, 1963, 602 pages.
Tomo XXVIII. Julho de 1918 a março de 1919. Editoral
Política. Havana, 1964, 527 pages.
Tomo XXIX. Março a agosto de 1919. Editoral Política.
Havana, 1963, 602 pages.
Tomo XXX. Setembro de 1919 a abril de 1920. Editoral
Política. Havana, 1963, 562 pages.
Tomo XXXI. Abril a Dezembro de 1920. Editoral Política.
Havana, 1963, 555 pages.
Tomo XXXII. 30 de dezembro de 1920 a 14 de agosto de
1921. Editoral Política. Havana, 1964, 553 pages.
Tomo XXXIII. Agosto de 1921 a março de 1923. Editoral
Política. Havana, 1964, 505 pages.
Tomo XXXIV. CARTAS. Novembro de 1895 a novembro de 1911.
Editoral Política. Havana, 1964, 503 pages.
Tomo XXXV. CARTAS. Fevereiro de 1912 a dezembro de 1922.
Editoral Política. Havana, 1964, 611 pages.
Tomo XXXVI. CARTAS. 1900 A 1923. Editoral Política.
Havana, 1964, 716 pages.
Tomo XXXVII. CARTAS. Novembro de 1897 a julho de 1904.
Editoral Cartago. Buenos Aires. 1971, 413 pages.
Tomo XXXVIII. ANOTAÇÕES FILOSÓFICAS. Editoral
Política. Havana, 1964, 604 pages.
Tomo XXXIX. CARTAS. Novembro de 1912 a dezembro de 1916.
Editoral Cartago. Buenos Aires. 1971, 428 pages.
Tomo XL. CARTAS. Janeiro de 1917 a novembro de 1922.
Editoral Cartago. Buenos Aires. 1972, 463 pages.
Tomo XLI. CARTAS AOS FAMILIARES. 1893-1922. Editoral
Cartago. Buenos Aires. 1972, 596 pages.
Tomo XLII. INDICE DE NOMES E BIBLIOGRAFIA. Editorial
Política. Havana. 1963. 334 pages.
(ao que tudo indica, o volume seguinte na coleção de
Havana é o volume anterior da coleção de Buenos Aires)
TOMO XLIV. Cadernos sobre o imperialismo. Editorial
Cartago, Buenos Aires. 1972. 429 pages.
TOMO XLV. Índice Temático volume 1. Editorial Cartago,
Buenos Aires. 1973. 386 pages.
TOMO XLVI. Índice Temático volume 2. Editorial
Cartago, Buenos Aires. 1972. 363 pages.
Tomo complementario 1. INDICE ONOMÁSTICO. Editorial
Cartago. Buenos Aires, 1969, 309 pages.
Tomo complementario 2.INDICE ONOMÁSTICO. Editorial
Cartago. Buenos Aires, 1970. 340 pages.
Tomo complementario 3. INDICE ONOMÁSTICO.Editorial
Cartago. Buenos Aires, 1971. 317 pages.
Tomo complementario 4. INDICE ONOMÁSTICO.Editorial
Cartago. Buenos Aires, 1971. 269 pages.
Lista de equivalencias para ubicar en la 1. edición de
las Obras Completas, los trabajos de V.I.Lenin publicados en la
2.edicion. Editorial Cartago. Buenos Aires, 1973. 209 pages.
Lista de equivalencias para ubicar en la 2. edición de
las Obras Completas, los trabajos de V.I.Lenin publicados en la
2.edicion. Editorial Cartago. Buenos Aires, 1973. 206 pages..
For those who understand Portuguese, it is possible
to read summaries of parts of the Complete Works Volumes on the
following links:
http://valterpomar.blogspot.com.br/2014/02/fichamento-1.html
http://valterpomar.blogspot.com.br/2014/02/fichamento-2.html
http://valterpomar.blogspot.com.br/2014/02/fichamento-3.html
http://valterpomar.blogspot.com.br/2014/02/fichamento-4-parte-a.html
http://valterpomar.blogspot.com.br/2014/02/fichamento-4-parte-b.html
http://valterpomar.blogspot.com.br/2014/02/fichamento-4-parte-c.html
http://valterpomar.blogspot.com.br/2014/02/fichamento-5.html
http://valterpomar.blogspot.com.br/2014/05/vil-fichamento-8.html
http://valterpomar.blogspot.com.br/2014/05/vil-fichamento-9.html
http://valterpomar.blogspot.com.br/2014/05/vil-fichamento-10.html
http://valterpomar.blogspot.com.br/2014/06/vil-fichamento-11.html
http://valterpomar.blogspot.com.br/2014/06/vil-fichamento-12.html
http://valterpomar.blogspot.com.br/2014/06/vil-fichamento-13.html
http://valterpomar.blogspot.com.br/2014/06/vil-fichamento-14.html
Russian
Revolution
The
third chapter is
a highly
abbreviated
adaptation
of the article
"Marx and
the critique of the
Russian
Revolution,"
written in May
2011 by
Wladimir
Pomar
and so far
unpublished.
Marx
and
Engels
believed that,
around 1850,
capitalism had already
reached its
highest degree
of development
because of
its technological advances
and its repetition of the
cyclical crises
and
insurgencys
that these
generate.
Marx and Engels believed that, around 1850, capitalism had already reached its highest degree of development because of its technological advances, its repetition of cyclical crises and the insurgencies generated by those crises. Under these conditions, It was believed that England, France, Germany and the United States would necessarily have the first socialist revolutions.
Although
Engels
later
revised
this assumption,
many of the Marxists
made the same
miscalculation. They
believed that capitalism
had reached its turning
point, prematurely
believing that the
beginning of imperialism meant that capitalism
had entered
its terminal phase.
Marx
and
Engels
assumed
that the capitalist
world market
would be able to
level imbalances in
economic development
between countries.
They
did not take into
account
that the
historical development
of the people and
countries
had
always been very
uneven,
from the earliest
ages,
and
that capitalism
would
also follow this
same evolutionary
law.
This should
have led them
to
predict
that socialism
would also present
as an uneven process
of development.
Marx
also
did not take into
account, for example,
that a new
globalization
(of
capitalist nature)
would significantly
increase the degree
of
exploitation of
underdeveloped countries
and
thereby
alleviate
the class struggle
in the advanced
countries,
from the viewpoint of the
capitalists.
Thus,
instead of
capitalism leveling differences between nations,
there would be not only
an extremely
uneven development,
but also a
situation where the
capital
of the most advanced
countries
could get a
super-profit
by exploiting the
most underdeveloped.
The workers
of the advanced capitalist
countries could be
corrupted
at the expense
of the
super-exploitation
of workers in
underdeveloped countries.
This
unequal development of capitalism, evident during the new colonial
expansion of the late 19th century and early 20th century, caused a
historical evolution that was not foreseen.
For
example, it provided
a much
more rapid development
of the capitalist mode
of production in
the core countries of
Europe and
North America,
and it allowed
greater economic
and
political concessions
to the workers
of these countries.
In
developed countries,
a strong
bourgeoisie
emerged.
Along with it, a State
developed that had the appearance
of being strongly democratic,
which also
gave concesscions to the
proletariat.
Instead
of
the impoverishment
predicted by
Marx,
workers in core nations experienced an
increase in
their economic
achievements, and
the middle class grew.
Socialism
seemed
to have become
dispensable,
starting with an outbreak
of Marxist
revisionism,
especially in Europe.
However,
in the underdeveloped capitalist societies, Marx's theses about the
increase of mass misery, followed by the increased social strengh of
workers, seemed to be fully confirmed. The introduction of elements
of the capitalist mode of production into these societies awakened
all the contradictions that were already present within them, putting
the possibility of socialist revolution on the agenda.
Clearly
this contradicts
Marx’s belief about the material conditions that would contribute
to the advance of socialism. But
the growth of
the struggle among workers, peasants and
other
working classes
in these countries,
as well as the conflicts
interest between the local
bourgeoisie and
the imperialist
bourgeoisie,
blurred
these contradictions.
They opened a new
horizon,
making it possibile that
socialist revolutions
would be
transferred from the
advanced capitalist
countries to
the undeveloped nations.
The
Socialists found
themselves facing
a historical
juncture in
which the
bourgeoisie had nurtured
the development
of capitalism, but
it did
not make
political revolution to
destroy the
anachronistic
political structures
or to
repeal
the
remannts of feudalism.
This situation
became
particularly
acute
in Russia, where
the expansion of capital
- driven by French
and
British companies
- lived within
an outdated
agrarian structure
and
an political aristocracy
that was resistant to
any change.
A
complex revolutionary situation developed within tsarist Russia. The
1905 insurrection was its first pratical manifestation.
There
were several political trends that were opposed to tsarism that
sought a path to overcome underdevelopment in Russia.
Populists
sought to
prevent
the development of
capitalism through
the expansion of the rural
peasant community.
Liberals,
or
cadets,
sought
an agreement with
tsarism
to
the introduction of small
reforms
in the monarchy.The
various Russian
social democratic
tendencies
argued for strategies along a spectrum from
bourgeois-democratic
revolution to
Among the Social Democrats,
Lenin’s theoretical and
practical solution of
stood out. He argued that
capitalism
was developing
unevenly
so, therefore,
the revolution was also
developing unevenly. It
would allow the proletariat
to reach hegemony,
even in the context
of a bourgeois
democratic
revolution.
In
this context, it was
possible to
initiate
a fight
against Russian
autocracy
and
capitalism,
in favor
of political democracy
which reflected socialist
demands. Building
on this program, workers were able
to
conquer
hegemony
in the
“soviets”
(or
councils) which
were the political
expression of
popular
power in the Russian
revolution.
Russia’s
participation in
the imperialist war, which
was unleashed
in 1914,
intensified
all the contradictions
of Russian society. There
were major
military defeats,
massive loss
of life, serious
food shortages, and
several rounds of drafting
armed
peasants
into military service.
Workers, peasants and
soldiers
were increasingly
organized in the
soviets.
These conditions transformed
the soviets into real
representative
organizations
of these social
classes. These Soviets
were organs of dmeocracy that existed
simultaneously and in
opposition to the
parliament under the
Tsarist
State (which was referred
to as the “Duma”).
There
were two revolutions in 1917. The February Revolution of 1917
overthrew the monarchy and established a parliamentary government.
The revolution of October and November 1917 overthrew the Cadet
government and established the Socialist government. There was a
heated debate over whether or not to recognize the power of the
Soviets, as a link of the democratic revolution to the socialist
revolution.
In
the political conditions
that led to the
revolutionary crisis
and
the outbreak of the
revolution, it would be
unthinkable to
assume that it would
be possible
to organize any
representative political
organization in the
absence of parliaments
worthy of the name
or of other
democratic bodies,
with the exception
of the Soviets.
of the call for “All
power to
the Soviets”
was the
only one which could
ensure the success
of the revolution,
even though most
of the Soviets
were under
the influence of
political forces that were
still
hesitant
about
the prospect of
revolution.
Although
Lenin always agreed with Marx that the socialist revolution had to
be global, he differed from Marx in his belief that it would be
possible to initiate and win socialist revolutions in the
underdeveloped countries, particularly if they had the support of
developed countries. The success of the Soviet revolution seemed to
prove Lenin right. It challenged the misconception of European
socialists that had given support to their governments to carry the
war on.
This
situation also contributed to the hypothesis that the model of the
Soviet Revolution could have turned into a universal model. However,
this model did not succeed in any other country, neither developed
nor undeveloped, with the exception of the Chinese Revolution.
Revolutionary attempts in Hungary and Germany failed. Although many
colonial countries intensified their revolutionary fight, none of
them were able to achieve decisive victories at the time. Lenin and
the Russian revolutionaries had to cope with the harsh reality of
erecting socialism in a single country.
Discussions
on which paths to follow
Soviet
Socialism started its path full of hopes and promises. But, at its
first steps, it had to face the brutal difficulties of being a
war-torn country, without the ‘support’ of a revolutionary
success in any other developed country. All the capitalist countries
imposed an economic blockade. Troops loyal to tsarism initiated a
civil war, and the military forces of thirteen different foreign
potencies invaded the Soviet Union. There were also internal
political disputes over which paths should be followed after the
seizure of political power.
The
Communist Party soon found
itself involved
in an intra-mural
civil
war
over
the direction
of
internal and external
policies. The
establishment of peace
required the power to make significant
territorial concessions
in 1918,
and this was the subject
of a
bitter political and
military dispute between
the various trends
of the party,
the government and the
revolutionary forces
of Russian society.
This was a dispute over
whether the priority should be to carry
the war on
as an instrument of
permanent revolution
against international
capitalism
or
to give priority to the
consolidation of the new
Soviet State.
Posteriorly,
the implement of NEP (New Economic Policy) gave place to splits, in
which Lenin and the Communist Party were labeled “traitors to the
revolution.” This treason seemed clear in the mind of many Russian
revolutionaries, after Lenin appealed to the Soviets to learn from
and adopt German State Capitalism. Even more severe were his
statements that it would not be possible to maintain proletarian
power in a ruined country that had a huge peasant population without
the help of capital.
There
were a number of brutal
manifestations
of the intense
internal war in the first
years of the Soviet Union: the revolt of the
sailors
of
Kronstadt,
the assassination attempt
against Lenin
by
Social Revolutionary party
members, and
the use of
terrorist actions against
the Communist Party
leaders and the state
by the Russian
extreme-left.
Lenin
argued that it would be necessary to take on loans from private
capital in order to develop the Soviet Union’s productive forces,
the material foundation without which it would be impossible to
achieve a necessary level of culture to create socialism. In the late
1920s, however, Stalin and the new Soviet leaders concluded that such
material foundations had already been built. Therefore, he started to
restrict the concessions to the capitalists that had been adopted by
NEP.
This
occurred simultaneously
with the ascension
of fascism in Europe, the
aggravation of
the international situation
and
the threat of
a new imperialist
world war.
In fact,
Stalin
and many others
thought the
pace of
NEP
would not allow the
Soviet Union
to industrialize
quickly enough
to deal with these
external threats.
The strategy
of
accelerating
industrialization
was also responsible for
the process of agricultural
collectivization,
which was essential
for the supplying the
workforce for industrial
production.
Meanwhile,
Stalin’s government initiated negotiations with several imperialist
countries, in the hope of preventing them from uniting against the
Soviet Union. The Soviet Communist Party began a new policy of
building a wide front to resist the ascention of fascism. It sought
to negotiate treaties of nonaggression with England and France and
to build resistance to the Nazis plans for territorial expansion.
These strategies provided a pretext for the resurgence of terrorist
acts against Soviet leaders, both within the Party and the state, by
political forces that called themselves “left-wing” trends.
When
the French and the British military maneuvered to push Nazi expansion
towards the Soviet Union, Stalin’s government decided to establish
a nonaggression treaty with Hitler’s Germany. This caused a great
controversy among leftists in the Societ Unions and large
cross-sections of the communist movement worldwide. The explanation
that the Soviet Union needed more time to prepare against Nazi
invasion. This explanation was not enough to avoid Stalin being
called “Hitler’s doormat” and as traitor to the cause of the
revolution.
This
situation only changed after the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union.
After the turning point of the Stalingrad battle, during which the
Soviets moved from defensive to offensive, the winds of war
definitely changed. Though with the Soviet Union suffered terrible
losses, estimated at over 30 million Soviets killed during the
conflict, the Soviet Union emerged from the war as a great socialist
world power.
In
short, it
was proved to be true that it was possible to build
socialist societies
in underdeveloped
countries,
even when they were isolated in
the context of the
majority of countries
being capitalist.
Accelerated
industrialization through
the exclusive action
of the State was also shown to be possible. This meant that all
countries could
avoid the
evils
of
capitalism
in the development
of their productive
forces.
Earlier
questions about
whether or not to
compete in the
international market
dominated by
capital, whether or not to
abolish the
private ownership of
the means of production
and the
market
seemed
resolved by the
rapid
success of the Soviet
Union. There
could be no more
questions about whether
Soviet
political power
could build
a socialist society
out of the
universal context,
unlike what
advocated
Marx,
Engels
and
Lenin himself.
The
experience of the Soviet Union and tendency for there to be
conflicts between imperialist countries themselves made it
inconceivable to argue that it would be inconceivable for the Soviet
power to exist alongside imperialist states for a long time and that,
in the end, one or the other would have to triumph.
The uneven development of capitalism and the abandonment
of the bourgeois democratic revolutionary mission by the bourgeiosie
in the undeveloped capitalist countries themselves created a
historical new circumstance, a circumstance which could not have been
foreseen by Marx and Engels. The example of the Russian revolution
showed that political revolutions, led by socialist and communist
parties in undeveloped countries, could complete the tasks that had
been left unfinished by the bourgiosie. They could carry out
socialist construction and, as Lenin advocated, reach a degree of
democratization that would ensure the domain of full power to the
majority of the population.
Looking
back, even
before consolidating
itself as political,
social and economic
system, the socialism of
the Russian revolution
became
a model that was
copied by
the rest of the
socialist
world.
The
Communist International
was founded
with the intention of
disseminating
the
Soviet model
wherever
there were
revolutionary movements
emerging
or
where there were people
willing to work
for socialist revolution.
After all, if
had worked
in the late
Tsarist Russia,
why would it not work
in other
underdeveloped countries?
As
Soviet power
consolidated and
exceeded the
brief experience
of NEP,
the Soviet Union entered into
a gigantic
industrialization process
to
deal with the threat
of
a new imperialist
war.
the Soveit model of
industrialization and
economic construction
had also become
widespread
as a model
which could be
followed by all
underdeveloped countries
in order to build
socialism.
The
Soviet victory
in
World War
against the Nazis
only
consolidated
these assumptions.
However,
once again history
was getting ready to
play tricks on
some ideas
that had previously been
considered
unshakeable,
making the
logic-dialectic
of development of
socio-economic
formations be imposed
staunchly
on
human decisions.
The Achilles heel
of those
unshakable
assumptions
lived
precisely
in the industrialization
process that
administratively
dismissed
the laws of political
economy.
The
Soviet path to industrialization
The
problem of
industrialization
constituted an important
instrument
for increasing the productivity
of labor and, therefore,
for producing greater
wealth to
meet society's consumption
needs. All
the capitalist countries
that had undertaken
industrialization required
an adequate combination
of existing resources,
which included
land,
raw materials,
labor and
accumulated capital.
This
combination
required
policies
to optimize
the potential of
each of these resources
and
to concentrate
efforts
on the key
aspects of the process.
In this sense,
the Soviet state
followed,
in general terms,
a process similar
to late European industrial
development.
That
is, it took
the form of an active
state intervention in the
economy
to promote economic
growth, giving priority to
the construction of large
industrial facilities and
the production
of capital goods,
with intense pressure to
raise the level
of investment,
even at the expense of
consumption levels,
and
to give a secondary role
to agriculture.
However,
the Soviet state went
much further.
After
ending
NEP,
it not only
intervened
to direct
investments;
it monopolized
all investments
and the entire ownership
of the
means of production,
except in few
small areas.
Thus,
the state concentrated
all the available
resources in its hands and
deployed
them according to a
central plan.
Instead
of deepening
the bourgeois-democratic
agrarian reform,
the Soviet state
initiated a
collectivization
process:
it expropriated the land
of the peasantry
and transformed the
peasantry into an
industrial
workforce.
Through this
agrarian
collectivization,
the state transferred
income from
agriculture to industry.
Although
the pressure to contain consumption levels had been, in many ways,
stronger than in late capitalism, the state centralization allowed a
more equitable distribution of income. Full employment meant that
social inequalities were greatly reduced. However, the Soviet state
was not able to substitute, from a certain degree of development, the
consumption contention by an relatively rapid expansion of mass
consumption.
The
Soviet Union indefinitely
maintained its
consumption
containment policy.
This was less about maintaining
high rates of industrial
investment and
economic growth, that it
was about managing the
costs required
by the armaments
race, first
against Nazi
aggression
and
then against
the threats of
nuclear war
and
the Cold War.
The
low level
of technical labor
productivity that
characterized the Soviet
industrialization
led to higher costs.
This, combined with the
lack of transfer
of technological
discoveries
from the
war industry
to civilian
industry
(for reasons of military
confidentiality)
eventually generated
growing popular
dissatisfaction with the
containment of consumption.
The
Soviet experience
was also shaped by
its attempt to
enact
an international
economic policy
that protected the
country
from the world capitalist
market.
The Soviets
believed that it was
possible to maintain only one
flow of trade with
the capitalist countries,
while
determining internal
prices through
centralized planning;
they treated the Ruble as
a non-convertible
currency. They
believed that the
socialist
countries had
all the resources
they needed for their
economic development,
and
they did not need
the capitalist countries
for anything.
This
belief isolated the Soviet Union, not only from international flow of
capital and market, but also from the flow of production technologies
and from rising standards in productivity and international
competitiveness. In a global market, these factors are crucial in
establishing the values of the commodities and, therefore, of prices
and salaries.
Effectively,
the Soviets worked
on the hypothesis that
their socialism
had reached a
level at which they
could dispense
with the fundamental
categories of
capitalism, such as wages,
price and
profit.
They assumed
that they were able
to get rid
of wage labor,
the production of surplus
value and
the production of goods
and
prices.
They did not
ask
why,
yet,
they kept wages and prices
as an exchange
relation
in their society.
They also did not
question
why they could
not
reach a
level of development
that would enable
the fulfillment of the
material and cultural
needs of members
of their society.
Instead
of protecting the
Soviet Union from
damaging effects
of the capital
action,
its isolation from
international capitalist
competition represented an
enormous barrier
to the development of
its productive forces.
After the
1960s,
the Soviet Union
entered a period of
growing stagnation,
making it impossible
to consolidate
the process
of effective
socialist construction.
In
the face of these challenges, the
Soviet government
decided to try to
enter the
international market.
But
it did so
in a
skewed
way, trying to
export its products to
capitalist countries
using
facilitated
credits
and
other benefits,
while
enacting limits
that prevented
full participation in the
world market.
Thus,
these attempts generally
failed, or
they had no continuity.
In
general, contrary to what
Marx
proposed,
the Soviets
moved
very quickly into the
process of “statization”
of the economy.
They did
so long before
they
had
developed
the conditions for the
abolition of private
property and
market. By
regulating the
means of production
in a
strictly administrative
way,
Soviet socialism
eliminated one of the
main instruments
that capitalism
had always used
to
constantly revolutionize
the productive forces
- competition - while
maintaining some
typical categories
of the capitalist
mode of production.
Although
its productive forces
had not
reached
a high
stage of development,
with limited scientific
and technological developments,
the Soviets believed
they were free
of competition and
market chaos,
replacing it with constant
efforts
on the part of workers
and
companies
to increase productivity.
They claimed that
the
Soviet man
was
an emancipated
and
free man,
although
he was still tied
to the dictates of
a society that
was primarily based
on
human labor.
The
entire Soviet effort
was dedicated to
improving human
performance in
the use
of machinery, rather than improving
productivity
by improving
the ability of
machines
to replace
human labor.
In this sense,
full employment and
the quantitative
goals of production,
unrelated
to commercialization,
were
opposed to
any efforts that could
revolutionize
production equipment
and processes.
Effectively,
they worked
as ingredients
which
discouraged
the replacement of
men
by machines
and, therefore,
the
scientific and
technological development
of industry.
Soviet
socialism elevated statism to a denial of capitalism as a whole, not
only to its monetarist aspect. They sought to abolish private
property and the market, administratively speaking. They found that
it was possible to abolish money and salaries. In practical terms, it
was not possible to liquidate the economic mechanisms that
demonstrated the necessity of the existence of private property and
market.
All
those elements
that have been
historically
developed
on a larger scale
by capitalism
- the workforce
to deploy
the means of production,
the salary
to remunerate the
work performed,
money as
means of exchange,
the price as a measure of
value,
the purchase and
sale
of goods
- continued
to inhabit
the Soviet
socialist system.
They could not
get rid of them.
As
almost always,
society
turned out to be
stronger than
the state
which was created
to control it.
When this
control
contradicted
the material trends
of its development
, the society
went on to create
their own mechanisms,
which broke the
order of the State.
They repositioned
concrete social
needs
on the agenda, monetarists
and
privatists needs
were artificially
extinct.
In choking monetarism,
the Soviet
state
developed a
long process of
anarchic suppuration
in the economy. In this
vaccum, underground
business grew, and
an exaggerated
privatism
developed in politics and
in personal relationships.
The
model
of Soviet social formation
did not give much
space for
popular
initiative
and pluralism,
in economics
or in
political life and
culture.
Paradoxically, the more
that popoular initiative
and
pluralism
were
mistaken for
“Individualism,”
“liberalism,” or “capitalism,” the more the Soviet
authorities applied state
control in
a desperate effort to
get rid of
so-called “bourgeois
remnants”
and to supposedly
advance the
socialist construction.
As
a result, the
Soviet economy marched
inexorably
towards stagnation
and
collapse.
The Soviets did not know
how to return to Marx.
In the
complex context
of a society that
had
not even
completed the first
capitalist modernization,
they interpreted
socialism as
the transition from
capitalism to
socialism. In an attempt to conduct
an orderly
strategic retreat,
the Soviet statism
sank
and was supplanted by the
voracity
of the Mafia
privatization
and neoliberal
monetarism.
The
final phase
Socialism
of Soviet type entered
a crisis
in the second half
of
1950.
In economics,
the crisis
showed
its
most evident signs with
the adoption of
a plan to
exploit the virgin
lands of
Western Siberia and
Kazakhstan in 1954.
Then, in 1955,
the Prime Minister Malenkov
was dismissed for his inability to
solve economic
problems
and for the shortage
of food and
daily consumer goods,
in particular.
In
1956, the
Kruschev
report
placed all responsibility
for the problems
in the Soviet Union
in Stalin’s Hands. Kruschev
announced a broad
program of administrative,
economic and educational
reforms.
He initiated an alleged
process of economic
decentralization,
in which republics were
given the responsibility for carrying out economic plans.
At the same time,
he suppressed the
machine and tractor
stations
that were responsible for
cultivation
and
harvest
of collective and
state farms
and reorganized
agriculture
in ways that intensified
the production of
corn and
livestock.
He also announced
the creation of new
technical and vocational
schools.
At
the same time, although
the Kruschev government formally
considered
Stalin's
policy towards
different nationalities
and the other countries
of the
called
socialist block to be
criminal, the new Soviet
central
government decided to
suffocate
popular emerging conflicts
in several of its
republics
and the
armed uprisings
in Poland
and Hungary
with the use of
military troops,
practicing
a policy
of direct interference in
all of countries
in which ir held
influence.
Between
1959 and 1960, the Soviet government decided to implement a plan to
surpass the industrial production and per capita income of the United
States within seven years. They initiated the construction of a new
program for communism. This new plan and program suffered a major
blow with the 1962 and 1963 agricultural crisis, which forced the
Soviet Union to shift from being an exporter of wheat to importing
wheat from Canada and Australia.
Also,
although officially
advocating a
policy of peaceful
coexistence with
the imperialist countries,
the Soviet government began
to work to make the
Soviet equal or even superior to the United States in
terms of missiles and
atomic power. This
was based on an evaluation
that
the
Western
capitalist powers
were entering
a
terminal crisis,
due to the
process of decolonization.
This led
the Soviet government
to pursue a
policy which
was called
‘dynamic engagement,’
including
intervention
in the Middle East,
the revocation
status of the
four powers
upon Berlin,
the execution of new
nuclear tests
and
the construction of
missile bases
in Cuba.
Effectively,
the Soviet government entered
the space and
arms race
with the United States
with all its might. At
the same time, Kruschev
signed a
non-proliferation treaty
(that is, for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons) with the
United States. It
directed part
of
its arsenal against China,
and it intervened
militarily in
Czechoslovakia,
in both cases
to prevent
the adoption of
national development
paths.
All these
external actions,
including
the successes of
spaceflights,
served to
mask the
deepening economic
and
social crisis in the
Soivet Union.
Despite
all the announced
reforms that
were, supposedly, aimed
to overcome the problems
of Stalin’s approach,
the
central planning
system
remained the same.
The prioritization
of heavy industry remained
unchanged, as
did support for the
war industry. The
imbalances between
different economic
departments increased,
in particular,
the imbalance between
heavy industry on the one hand and the
consumer goods
industry
and
agriculture on the other.
The
scarcity of goods became the primary focus of growing social
discontent. The Soviet system started to show increasing signs of
fatigue and fracture. Mafias that trafficked scarce goods developed,
and they were linked to the State, the Communist Party and
state-owned company leaders. In these conditions, the introduction
and implementation of plans for political opening (glasnost) and
economic reform (perestroika), in the 1980s, only hastened the
implosion of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.
All
enemies of
communism, socialism and
Marxism took advantage of
these events to show that
all these
“isms”
were
finally
buried,
never to return. With such
a crushing
defeat, Marx's
theories about
capitalism and
its overcoming
by a
new kind of society
were
treated as being defeated,
having ending
in indefensible
crimes.
The communist
and socialist
dreams
of equality, freedom
and
justice
came ot be seen as the
same as the utopian
illusions that
Marx
had criticized.
Marx’s ideas could not
be more
than an unfulfilled
prophecy.
Nevertheless,
capital has consistently demonstrated,
every day, that Marxist
analysis of the
capitalist
socio-economic
formation is correct,
in particular, through
capitalism’s scientific
and
technological development
and its
global crisis.
There is nothing
more logical
than to attempt to
evaluate the
Russian Revolution
and
the Soviet
construction, using the
method
of historical materialism,
the
tool that
Marx developed to analyze
not only the
development of
capitalist society, but
also the development of
all other social
formations in
human history.
The
subject of the State
Shortly
before the
1917 Russian revolution,
Lenin
sought to develop
Marx's
thesis of the state,
which
argued that socialism
would
overcome
the separation
between state and society.
At the time,
he faced
the challenge
of a State which
still
presented itself as
a repressive
machine,
where there was no
parliament
(in the Western
sense) and
where not even
the minimum
bourgeois political
freedoms
were in existence.
Lenin’s
practical solution for this political problem in the specific Russian
conjuncture was to argue for the establishment of workers hegemony in
the democratic revolution, through the Soviets. However, to develop
his theory of the state, Lenin eventually detached himself from the
concrete problems of the Russian Revolution.
He
formulated proposals
that could respond
to the obstables to the
development and
political socialization
of the advanced capitalist
countries,
but
which
had
little to do with
the
concrete
post-revolutionary
situation in Russia.
It would not be
possible to destroy
the separation
between state and society
in a country where
such a separation
never even occurred.
It would be impossible
to promote the
general
autonomy
of workers
in a country
that recorded
one of the lowest
rates of
civil,
technical, scientific and
cultural organization.
It would not be possible
to rebuild
the community from
one of the lowest
levels
of development in world
history.
The
dictates of the economic
centralization that was
required by the
accelerated
industrialization, by
the external blockage
and the
war preparations
limited the development
of technology, science and
culture. It foreclosed the development of civil society. Rather than
encouraging
popular participation in
state affairs,
through
pluralism
or through representative
mechanisms,
the Soviet state
merged with
the
leading party,
which became a single
party. The party state
declared itself the
interpreter of the
general
will of the people.
The
Communist Party
and
the State was encouraged
to become even more of a
monolithic
unit
in response to violence
from external threats
and
from the internal civil
war over
the path of
socialist construction.
These factors pushed them to abolish
all
formal mechanisms
of freedom and political
equality. Socialist
equality
was reduced
to alleged
economic equality.
In
the absence of
private ownership of the
means of production,
the idea that
all Soviets
were equal
gained
the status of truth,
making the formal
mechanisms of
freedom an unnecessary
policy.
This
aberration
became
strongly
clear as
economic equality
also deteriorated,
and
the nomenclature
of privilege
came to be detached
from the ordinary
citizen’s life. This
created a situation
where the absence
of democracy and
civil participation
in the Soviet
state, which was
associated with economic
stagnation and
a growing shortage
of consumer goods,
led to a
social
aversion
to socialism.
When
Glasnost
was implemented
in the 1980s,
democratization did not
find a happy
society
with
economic and
social achievements,
able to
absorb and
appropriate many of the
political functions
that had been monopolized
by the despotic
state and
to give a new
direction to socialist
construction. On
the contrary, it found
a society
tired
of
unfulfilled
socialist promises.
Political pluralism
functioned
as
an explosive,
resulting in a
destructive process
that
made it impossible
to
hope that a relatively
advanced
liberal
democracy would develop.
The
events of the Soviet Union during the 1980s and early 1990s showed
that - in the absence of an economy that was able to efficiently
attend the social needs, of a strong civil society and of a statethat
was committed to the people and their democratic aspirations in the
economic, social, cultural and political fields - wild capitalism is
given free rein. The fragmentation of the Soviet Union was
characterized by robber barons, political and social anarchy, and new
authoritarian and despotic adventures took over.
For
all these reasons, it
would be a mistake for socialists to
criticize the
Soviet experience without
extracting out
the lessons from the political mistakes which
led to the failure of the
attempts to
consolidate of the
first victorious
workers’ revolution
in human history,
the Russian Revolution
of 1917.
Lenin’s
contribution to the Socialist mindset
There
is a wide bibliography
on "Leninism".
Part of it
presents
Lenin
as a prophet.
The other
part
presents him as
a demon.
There are two
points of
view
apparently
antagonistic,
but
they are methodologically
similar.
Clearly
we take
the point of view
which presents Lenin
in a positive way,
particualrly,
1
Lenin’s contribuition
to the class struggle for
socialism in
his time;2)
The method of analysis
adopted
by Lenin
to address the problems
of his time.
The
contribution of
Lenin to
the class struggle for socialism
in his time
was huge. Between 1917
and 1924,
he was the
main leader
of the first
victorious socialist
revolution
in human history
As a result,
all
the issues faced in the
socialist movement
between 1917
and 1991 were in
dialogue
with Lenin’s
thoughts
and aciton.
Insofar as there are similarities between these historic issues and the fight for socialism in the 21st century, the thought and work of Lenin again has an important place.
Lenin was, between 1917 and 1924, the main leader of the
first victorious socialist revolution in human history, because he
had been, between 1902 and 1924, the main leader of the party that
hegemonized the Russian Revolution of 1917: the Social-Democratic
Labour Russian (Bolshevik).
Lenin
was the
main leader
of the RSDLP
because
he built
an interpretation
of the capitalist
development process
in Russia, both
practicaly
and theoretically. This
interpretation
was
the basis of the program,
the strategy, tactics
and
the concept of the party
that Lenin
argued for and the was adopted,
with greater or lesser
resistance,
by the whole Bolshevik
Party.
Lenin’s
interpretation
on the development
of capitalism in Russia
was initially
built in the
fight against
‘populism’
and
against
‘Legal Marxism’.
"Populism" was a theoretical trend that argued for a road to socialism that did not go through capitalism.
"Legal Marxism" was a theoretical trend which argued that the socialists role was to help to develop capitalism.
Lenin
identified
populism
with the interests
of
parts of the
Russian peasantry,
and
heidentified the
legal Marxism
with
the interests of
parts of
the Russian bourgeoisie.
Lenin identified his own position with the proletariat, that is, the class of wage laborers, specifically with the factory workers .
The interpretation built by Lenin was a product of an intense work: a lot of reading, a lot of study, a lot of analysis of raw statistical data. In the words of Lenin, he developed a concrete analysis of the concrete situation. This analysis was followed by the decision to produce a theory that would work as a guide for action.
When we read all the texts gathered in the Complete
Works, especially the personal letters, we get a glimpse of this
characteristic of Lenin: his immense capacity of work, his full
dedication to the cause and his capacity to describe, in an
accessible way, the most complex themes (a capacity that was similar
to Engels).
Based on his interpretation of the
development of capitalism in Russia, Lenin developed views about each
aspect of the program, the strategy, tactics and party conception.
We can pull out several key contributions:
a) the agrarian question and its relation to capitalist development in Russia;
b) the role of the Russian working class, its leading role in the evolution of Russia;
c) the role of the party and the revolutionary intelligentsia;
d) the strategy and tactics in the fight for bourgeois revolution and the socialist revolution in Russia.
What
were the influences on Lenin’s viewpoints?
In addition to his personal experiences, there was the influence of Russian and European culture of the time, particularly the revolutionary traditions and the thinking of Chernichevsky, Marx, Engels, Plekhanov and Kautstky.
Lenin
was deeply familiar with
the work of Marx
and
Engels.
From their thinking, he
drew his own views
on the
seizure of power, on
the socialist
transition, on
international relations
and
on the development
of capitalism
on a world scale.
What
was the nature of
the analytical method that
Lenin adopted
to address the problems
of his time?
The answer is:
an analysis of class
struggle. Therefore,
those who wish to
do as
Lenin did
should start
with this:
take class analysis and
the
struggle between the
classes as
the starting point.
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